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I. INTRODUCTION
Often the problem of model uncertainty in an optimization framework is dealt with by weighing the optimal outcomes with the respective probabilities in the form of an appropriately adjusted utility function (Holtham and Hughes Hallett, 1992; Frankel and Rockett, 1988) . Alternatively, and if the losses from applying the wrong rule are considerable, policymakers often prefer to use rules that, although not optimal given the true economic model, perform relatively well across the spectrum of different possible models (Levin and others, 2001 In this paper we do not concern ourselves with the nature of robust rules. Instead, we provide for two issues: First, given the existence of at least one robust rule, we show for which levels of uncertainty one should apply the robust rule and when to revert back to using the optimal rules. Section III.A demonstrates this for the case of risk neutral preferences. Second, we show that the desire to apply a robust rule is linked to risk aversion such that as the latter increases, the likelihood of applying a given robust rule also increases (section III.B).
II. OPTIMAL VERSUS ROBUST RULES: A MODEL
Assume a central bank (CB) that optimizes the following loss function:
with respect to its instrument, the interest rate r, and subject to the economic model prevailing, M. Vector x represents the objectives, inflation and output, as deviations from their targets, and Q is a preference matrix of the central bank with the weights on the diagonal and zeros everywhere else. Function L is continuous and twice differentiable, and M is a system of equations that define the constraining model. The optimization procedure produces a rule with respect to the instrument r:
We assume symmetric information between the central bank and the private sector. The system is characterized by uncertainty in the sense that a number of different models are candidates to explain the economy ex post. Which economic model will, in fact, prevail, however, is not known to the central bank. Suppose therefore, that the economy operates either as model M = A or as model M = B and, as we deal with a static world, no learning takes place. If model A is assumed, the optimal rule is A r ; if however, model B is assumed to be correct, then the optimal rule is B r . The question that arises is which rule to apply given the uncertainty of which model will prevail. The sequence of events is such that the CB needs to take a decision as to which rule to implement first, and only after is the true model of the economy actually revealed.
This implies, therefore, that the decision may actually turn out to be the wrong one. In a world where the economy can be described by only two alternative models, four different outcomes can therefore occur ex post: We suppose model A occurs with ex ante probability q and model B with ex ante probability (1-q). This probability q is fixed and exogenously given, but unknown to the central bank. Then, under risk neutrality, the disutility of applying each of the rules is given by the expected losses:
Naturally, the decision as to which one to implement is based on which of the two rules produces the lowest expected losses. The central bank will thus need to form a view on q and apply policies accordingly. This, however, leaves the possibility of having applied the wrong rule, incurring ex post losses ,
And if these losses happen to be sufficiently large, then having applied the correct rule ex post becomes much more imperative. This is the reason that policymakers often search for alternative rules, which, although not optimal given the true economic model that actually prevails, have nevertheless the property of performing reasonably well across the spectrum of possible models. Assuming that such a rule exists, say C r , there are two possibilities: • C r rule is implemented and A occurs, incurring losses ,
r rule is implemented and B occurs, incurring losses ,
The disutility of using rule r C is now , ,
Rule C r will be implemented only if, for some probabilities, C r produces smaller losses than both A r and B r . We label this property robustness in the given probability space.
We denote q* the probability for which the central bank is indifferent between applying A r or B r .
Definition 1:
A rule C r is considered robust vis-à-vis any optimal rules when two conditions hold:
1. Evaluated at *, ( *) ( *) ( *)
' '
The first condition ensures that there is a range of probabilities for which it is optimal to apply C r and the second that the losses incurred are relatively invariant to the degree of uncertainty by comparison to the other two rules. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the definition 3 and plots the expected losses of the three rules in terms of the unknown probability q. 3 Figure 2 refers to the case when risk neutrality is assumed. Our definition, however, holds irrespective of risk preferences.
It follows that, for a robust rule, the following hold:
and, from the second condition of the definition we have that
In what follows, we provide a framework that links the desirability of robust rules to the policymaker's degree of risk aversion.
III. POLICY RULES AND RISK PREFERENCES

A. LOSSES WITH RISK NEUTRALITY
Without loss of generality, we normalize ,
Furthermore, the value of q for which the central bank is indifferent between C r and A r ( B r ) is A q ( B q ). Looking again at Figure 2 , we note that from equations (1) and (2) for i=A,B,C. In relation to the robust rule C r , it is also the case that
which holds (0,1) q ∀ ∈ and follows from equations (4) and (5). This is necessarily the case because, for a given level of risk aversion, the degree of concavity is an increasing function of the distances , ,
for each of the rules, respectively. This reflects the range of losses across the probability spectrum when each rule is applied to either of the two models. By definition, this is less for the robust rule. Figure 3 : Utility with Risk Aversion robust rule r C will produce lower ex ante expected losses for a greater spectrum of probabilities 5 . Furthermore, as the degree of risk aversion increases, so does the concavity of the utility functions, increasing the discrepancy between the magnitudes in (6) and (7), and, hence, increasing the range for which r C is preferred 6 .
IV. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS
Our objective was to show that the search for robust rules is dependent on the expected losses from applying optimal rules to incorrect models. We also show that this becomes even more eminent for risk averse policymakers. Our analysis does not provide an indication as to whether such rules exist or what their features would be 7 . Instead, we aim to formalize the comparison between robust and optimal rules and demonstrate how the former become more desirable as preferences become more risk averse. (proof by analogy).
